On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on the people of Hiroshima. What these people were laboring to construct, directly or indirectly, were two types of weaponsa gun-type weapon using U-235 and an implosion weapon using plutonium (although the possibility of U-235 was also under consideration). [14], Firebombing raids on other cities followed Tokyo, including Osaka, Kobe, Yokahama, and Nagoya, but with fewer casualties (many civilians had fled the cities). How familiar was President Truman with the concepts that led target planners chose major cities as targets? RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files (H-B Files), folder 69 (copy from microfilm), While Groves worried about the engineering and production problems, key War Department advisers were becoming troubled over the diplomatic and political implications of these enormously powerful weapons and the dangers of a global nuclear arms race. Both Richard Frank and Barton Bernstein have used intelligence reporting and analysis of the major buildup of Japanese forces on southern Kyushu to argue that U.S. military planners were so concerned about this development that by early August 1945 they were reconsidering their invasion plans. Since the 1960s, when the declassification of important sources began, historians have engaged in vigorous debate over the bomb and the end of World War II. If ending the war quickly was the most important motivation of Truman and his advisers to what extent did they see an atomic diplomacy capability as a bonus? An account of the cabinet debates on August 13 prepared by Information Minister Toshiro Shimamura showed the same divisions as before; Anami and a few other ministers continued to argue that the Allies threatened the kokutai and that setting the four conditions (no occupation, etc.) This account hints at discussion of the atomic bomb (certain other matters), but no documents disclose that part of the meeting. and offer details on potential protection (protective clothing against a uranium bomb includes rubber and any kind of insulation against electricity). After Stalin reviewed in considerable detail, Soviet military gains in the Far East, they discussed the possible impact of the atomic bombing on Japans position (Nagasaki had not yet been attacked) and the dangers and difficulty of an atomic weapons program. 202-994-7000 ornsarchiv@gwu.edu, Nagasaki, August 10, 1945; photograph by Yosuke Yamahata; used with permission of copyright holder, Shogo Yamahata/Courtesy: IDG films. Concerned that President Roosevelt had an overly cavalier belief about the possibility of maintaining a post-war Anglo-American atomic monopoly, Bush and Conant recognized the limits of secrecy and wanted to disabuse senior officials of the notion that an atomic monopoly was possible. This personal account, written on Tinian, reports his fears about the danger of a nuclear accident, the confusion surrounding the Nagasaki attack, and early Air Force thinking about a nuclear strike force. Evaluate this . The author recommended issuing the declaration just before the bombardment program [against Japan] reaches its peak. Next to that suggestion, Stimson or someone in his immediate office, wrote S1, implying that the atomic bombing of Japanese cities was highly relevant to the timing issue. To suggest alternatives, they drafted this memorandum about the importance of the international exchange of information and international inspection to stem dangerous nuclear competition. The largest nuclear weapon ever set off, it produced the most powerful human-made explosion ever recorded. Fears and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Southern Kyushu Have Occurred?Pacific Historical Review68 (1999): 561-609. Alperovitz and Sherwin have argued that Truman made a real decision to use the bomb on Japan by choosing between various forms of diplomacy and warfare. In contrast, Bernstein found that Truman never questioned [the] assumption that the bomb would and should be used. . [15]. See also Alex Wellersteins The Kyoto Misconception. [27]. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. [29]. Russia is very much in the minds of the people who give any thought to world affairs, and distrust and suspicion of her are very widespread. The question is: The Untied States decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post-Second-World-War era rather then a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional suuender. Plainly he was troubled by the devastation and suffering caused by the bombings, but he found it justifiable because it saved the lives of U.S. troops. Is control of nuclear weapons necessary to maintain peace? The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation, VII. The total destruction of that city, and the instant incineration of 40,000 mostly civilian people, occurred just three days after the destruction of Hiroshima by a 15-kiloton uranium bomb, which instantly killed 70,000. Moscow's was 3,000 times . Yonai was upset that Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu and naval chief Suemu Toyada had sent the emperor a memorandum arguing that acceptance of the Brynes note would desecrate the emperors dignity and turn Japan into virtually a slave nation. The emperor chided Umezu and Toyoda for drawing hasty conclusions; in this he had the support of Yonai, who also dressed them down. For useful discussion of this meeting and the other Target Committee meetings, see Norris, 382-386. This criminal one-two punch by the US launched the atomic age. A modern-day nuclear bomb . For years debate has raged over whether the US was right to drop two atomic bombs on Japan during the final weeks of the Second World War. For Davies at Potsdam, see Elizabeth Kimball MacLean,Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 151-166. Since these issues will be subjects of hot debate for many more years, the Archive has once again refreshed its compilation of declassified U.S. government documents and translated Japanese records that first appeared on these pages in 2005. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), A "Fat Man" test unit being raised from the pit into the bomb bay of a B-29 for bombing practice during the weeks before the attack on Nagasaki. They caused terrible human losses and destruction at the time and more deaths and sickness in the years ahead from the radiation effects. I am lost! In 1934, Japan ended its cooperation with other major powers in the Pacific by withdrawing from the Five Power Treaty. On this date 74 years ago, the US dropped the first of two atomic bombs on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, killing more than 70,000 people instantly. The diary entries cover July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30 and include Trumans thinking about a number of issues and developments, including his reactions to Churchill and Stalin, the atomic bomb and how it should be targeted, the possible impact of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and his decision to tell Stalin about the bomb. [69]. Information from the late John Taylor, National Archives. The Soviet source reported that the weight of the device was 3 tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of 5 kilotons. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), This shows the "Little Boy" weapon in the pit ready for loading into the bomb bay of the Enola Gay. This photo was taken from the Red Cross Hospital Building about one mile from the bomb burst. Thus, he wanted Roosevelts instructions as to whether the project should be vigorously pushed throughout. Unlike the pilot plant proposal described above, Bush described a real production order for the bomb, at an estimated cost of a serious figure: $400 million, which was an optimistic projection given the eventual cost of $1.9 billion. 76 (copy from microfilm), Physicists Leo Szilard and James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, were on the staff of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, a cover for the Manhattan Project program to produce fuel for the bomb. Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with Truman and that White House appointment logs support that claim. This issue of the diplomatic summary also includes Togos account of his notification of the Soviet declaration of war, reports of Soviet military operations in the Far East, and intercepts of French diplomatic traffic. Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and under the direction of General Leslie Grove, Bush outlined to Roosevelt the effort necessary to produce six fission bombs. With direct access to the documents, readers may develop their own answers to the questions raised above. . There were battles and military posts in surprising places. In light of Japans efforts to seek Soviet mediation, Stalin wanted to enter the war quickly lest Tokyo reach a compromise peace with the Americans and the British at Moscows expense. Truman read Stimsons proposal, which he said was powerful, but made no commitments to the details, e.g., the position of the emperor. Ramsey, a physicist, served as deputy director of the bomb delivery group, Project Alberta. Dbq help!! Confronting the Problem of Radiation Poisoning, XII. The destruction was. It is part of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. 816-268-8200 | 800-833-1225 He believed it essential that the United States declare its intention to preserve the institution of the emperor. Lacking direct knowledge of conditions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Henshaw and Coveyou had their own data on the biological effects of radiation and could make educated guesses. [11], Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret, G 77, Commanding Generals file no. Read more, The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. Barton J. Bernsteins numerous articles in scholarly publications (many of them are listed in Walkers assessment of the literature) constitute an invaluable guide to primary sources. Frank, 273-274; Bernstein, The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. The First Nuclear Strikes and their Impact, XI. The target is and was always expected to be Japan., These documents have important implications for the perennial debate over whether Truman inherited assumptions from the Roosevelt administration that the bomb would be used when available or that he madethedecision to do so. [61], Documents 73A-B: Ramsey Letter from Tinian Island, Library of Congress, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, box 60, Ramsey, Norman. Photo restoration by TX Unlimited, San Francisco, A nuclear weapon of the "Little Boy" type, the uranium gun-type detonated over Hiroshima. Public Reaction to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April 1947. On August 6,1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by atomic bombs that were dropped by the U.S Military. According to Merkulov, two fissile materials were being produced: element-49 (plutonium), and U-235; the test device was fueled by plutonium. The document was then circulated on November 22, 1945 by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Stalin, Lavrentyi Beria (at that point appointed as head of the Soviet atomic bomb project), and Politburo members Georgy Malenkov and Anastas Mikoyan. This memorandum from General Groves to General Marshall captured how far the Manhattan Project had come in less than two years since Bushs December 1942 report to President Roosevelt. Also important to take into account is John Dowers extensive discussion of Hiroshima/Nagasaki in context of the U.S. fire-bombings of Japanese cities inCultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq(New York, W. Norton, 2010), 163-285. Malloy (2008), 49-50. The panel argued for early military use but not before informing key allies about the atomic project to open a dialogue on how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations., Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal Files, 1942-1945, box 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th. Churchill and India: Manipulation or Betrayal? The destruction of two cities and their civilians merely to intimidate Russia seems to be an overtly extreme and vicious act that no rational person would deem just. Hirohito asked the leadership to accept the Note, which he believed was well intentioned on the matter of the national polity (by leaving open a possible role for the Emperor). Signed by about 68 Manhattan Project scientists, mainly physicists and biologists (copies with the remaining signatures are in the archival file), the petition did not explicitly reject military use, but raised questions about an arms race that military use could instigate and requested Truman to publicize detailed terms for Japanese surrender. As Yonai explained to Tagaki, he had also confronted naval vice Chief Takijiro Onishi to make sure that he obeyed any decision by the Emperor. Fax: 202/994-7005Contact by email. Debates on Alternatives to First Use and Unconditional Surrender, IV. According to a 2006 study by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, while John F. Kennedy was campaigning in 1960 on the idea that there was a "missile gap" between the United States and Russia . 576 words. Russias annexation of Crimea in February 2014 escalated tensions between Washington and Moscow and changed the global perception of Russias role in international politics. Not altogether certain that surrender was imminent, Army intelligence did not rule out the possibility that Tokyo would try to drag out the negotiations or reject the Byrnes proposal and continue fighting. By 1937 Japan controlled large sections of China and accusations of war crimes against the Chinese people became commonplace. The record of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. President Truman, who ordered the bomb, defended it as a way to bring about surrender and save U.S. military lives that would have been lost in a ground invasion of Japan. [77]. The ensuing war was costly. The notion that the atomic bombs caused . For an important study of how contemporary officials and scientists looked at the atomic bomb prior to first use in Japan, see Michael D. Gordin,Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). For emphasis on the shock of the atomic bomb, see also Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill, Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock, in Saki Dockrill, ed.,From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima : the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945(New York, St. Martins Press, 1994), 191-214. Third update - August 7, 2017, For more information, contact: What did senior officials know about the effects of atomic bombs before they were first used. At 8:15 am Hiroshima time, Little Boy was dropped. Hasegawa, 105; Alperovitz, 67-72; Forrest Pogue,George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959(New York: Viking, 1987), 18. [53], RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages (Magic Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547, This Far East Summary included reports on the Japanese Armys plans to disperse fuel stocks to reduce vulnerability to bombing attacks, the text of a directive by the commander of naval forces on Operation Homeland, the preparations and planning to repel a U.S. invasion of Honshu, and the specific identification of army divisions located in, or moving into, Kyushu. Before he received Togos message, Sato had already met with Molotov on another matter. By the summer, once production plants would be at work, he proposed that the War Department take over the project. As part of the war with Japan, the Army Air Force waged a campaign to destroy major industrial centers with incendiary bombs. The war had shown that the Japanese were fighting for the Emperor who convinced them that it was better to die than surrender. For discussion of the importance of this memorandum, see Sherwin, 126-127, and Hershberg, James B. Conant, 203-207. On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, a State Department draft of the proclamation to Japan contained language which modified unconditional surrender by promising to retain the emperor. More intercepted messages on the bombing of Hiroshima. None of these sections are about damage to human beings. This document is General Curtis LeMays report on the firebombing of Tokyo--the most destructive air raid in history--which burned down over 16 square miles of the city, killed up to 100,000 civilians (the official figure was 83,793), injured more than 40,000, and made over 1 million homeless. Were the Japanese ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped? For the inception of the Soviet nuclear program and the role of espionage in facilitating it, see Holloway,Stalin and the Bomb(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994). Tagaki was soon at the center of a cabal of Japanese defense officials, civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor would have to impose his decision on the military and the government. Takagi kept a detailed account of his activities, part of which was in diary form, the other part of which he kept on index cards. The United States, then, dropped the bombs to end the war that Japan had unleashed in Asia in 1931 and extended to the United States at Pearl Harborand thereby probably avoided an invasion that. Hiroshima - view of Hiroshima Castle and surroundings; Bernsteins detailed commentary on Trumans diary has not been reproduced here except for the opening pages where he provides context and background. Contributors to the historical controversy have deployed the documents selected here to support their arguments about the first use of nuclear weapons and the end of World War II. According to Robert S. Norris, this was the fateful decision to turn over the atomic project to military control.[8]. It is commonly believed that the awesome devastation of the atomic bombs caused the Japanese government to capitulate. The handwritten transcriptions are on the original archival copies. As to how the war with Japan would end, he saw it as unpredictable, but speculated that it will take Russian entry into the war, combined with a landing, or imminent threat of a landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them of the hopelessness of their situation. Lincoln derided Hoovers casualty estimate of 500,000. [73]. [67], National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 1940-1945, box 12, Exec #2. Stimson accepted the language believing that a speedy reply to the Japanese would allow the United States to get the homeland into our hands before the Russians could put in any substantial claim to occupy and help rule it. If the note had included specific provision for a constitutional monarchy, Hasegawa argues, it would have taken the wind out of the sails of the military faction and Japan might have surrendered several days earlier, on August 11 or 12 instead of August 14. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows, nuclear threats are real, present, and dangerous. The atomic bomb is the subject of much controversy. The conventional justification for the atomic bombings is that they prevented the invasion of Japan, thus saving countless lives on both sides. When former Secretary of State Cordell Hull learned about it he outlined his objections to Byrnes, arguing that it might be better to wait the climax of allied bombing and Russias entry into the war. Byrnes was already inclined to reject that part of the draft, but Hulls argument may have reinforced his decision. My analysis will provide some historical and political context and offer an initial assessment of these documents. The combination of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Tokyos surrender. Correspondence,International Security16 (Winter 1991/1992): 214-221. George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA (copy courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein), Groves informed General Marshall that he was making plans for the use of a third atomic weapon sometime after 17 August, depending on the weather. [75]. The Truman Library has published a helpful collection of archival documents, some of which are included in the present collection. Social critic Dwight MacDonald published trenchant criticisms immediately after Hiroshima-Nagasaki; seePolitics Past: Essays in Political Criticism(New York: Viking, 1972), 169-180. The Soviet invasion was.[58], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Included are documents on the early stages of the U.S. atomic bomb project, Army Air Force GeneralCurtis LeMays reporton the firebombing of Tokyo (March 1945), Secretary of War HenryStimsons requestsfor modification of unconditional surrender terms,Soviet documentsrelating to the events, excerpts from the Robert P. Meiklejohn diaries mentioned above, and selections from the diaries of Walter J. 1. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were militarily acceptable he doubted that they were workable or that they could check Soviet expansion which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II. If the United States had been more flexible about the demand for unconditional surrender by explicitly or implicitly guaranteeing a constitutional monarchy would Japan have surrendered earlier than it did? [36]. Private collections were also important, such as the Henry L. Stimson Papers held at Yale University (although available on microfilm, for example, at the Library of Congress) and the papers of W. Averell Harriman at the Library of Congress. Whether or not the atomic bombs should have been dropped is a topic that is still debated. Peter Grose,Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 170-174, 248-249. The peace party, however, deftly maneuvered to break the stalemate by persuading a reluctant emperor to intervene. [43]. [80], Despite Trumans claim that he made the most terrible decision at Potsdam, he assigned himself more responsibility than the historical record supports. In this context, Naryshkins words gain a particular nuance: the anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were an excellent opportunity for Moscow to revive its relationship with Tokyo, which irritated US officials at a time when the United States sought a united front with its ally in light of Russias increasingly aggressive behavior. His vivid account shows that senior military officials in the Manhattan Project were no longer dismissive of reports of radiation poisoning. [48], This Magic summary includes messages from both Togo and Sato. The documents can help readers to make up their own minds about long-standing controversies such as whether the first use of atomic weapons was justified, whether President Harry S. Truman had alternatives to atomic attacks for ending the war, and what the impact of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan was. The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and I weighed that decision most prayerfully. An intercepted message from Togo to Sato showed that Tokyo remained interested in securing Moscows good office but that it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once. [W]e are exerting ourselves to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms. Barton Bernstein, Richard Frank, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, among others, have argued that the Magic intercepts from the end of July and early August show that the Japanese were far from ready to surrender. Pages 12 through 15 of those notes refer to the atomic bombing of Japan: You know the most terrible decision a man ever had to make was made by me at Potsdam. For background on Magic and the Purple code, see John Prados,Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), 161-172 and David Kahn,The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing(New York: Scribner, 1996), 1-67. [63]. By Marc Gallicchio. In the course of the conversation, Harriman received a message from Washington that included the proposed U.S. reply and a request for Soviet support of the reply. For example, Bernstein cites the entries for 20 and 24 July to argue that American leaders did not view Soviet entry as a substitute for the bomb but that the latter would be so powerful, and the Soviet presence in Manchuria so militarily significant, that there was no need for actual Soviet intervention in the war. For Brown's diary entry of 3 August 9 1945 historians have developed conflicting interpretations (See discussion of document 57). Did Truman authorize the use of atomic bombs for diplomatic-political reasons-- to intimidate the Soviets--or was his major goal to force Japan to surrender and bring the war to an early end? Documents 67A-B:Early High-level Reactions to the Hiroshima Bombing, Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed. Since 2005, the collection has been updated. Shusen Shiroku (The Historical Records of the End of the War), annotated by Jun Eto, volume 4, 57-60 [Excerpts] [Translation by Toshihiro Higuchi], Excerpts from the Foreign Ministry's compilation about the end of the war show how news of the bombing reached Tokyo as well as how Foreign Minister's Togo initially reacted to reports about Hiroshima. The Japanese were vicious fighters, however, and every victory cost more time, material, and, sadly, lives. The non-specialist staff sent to observe these effects, their biased premise, and the markings on the documents all suggest that the report was from the beginning meant to anticipate and align with Stalins intention to downplay the importance of the United States atomic bomb while pushing the Soviet Unions own nuclear project forward.
Bu Daily Parking Program,
Ferguson Jenkins Wife,
Tale Of Two Cities Marquis Runs Over Child Quote,
Articles A